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Introduction
Security and Human Rights: The Search
for a Language of Reconciliation
LIORA LAZARUS and BENJAMIN J GOOLD

T

HE ATTAINMENT OF security and the protection of human rights are
not necessarily antithetical, either as a matter of fact or principle.
Nevertheless, since 9/11 the words ‘security’ and ‘human rights’ have, in the
collective imagination, now come to connote an almost insuperable opposition.
Anyone who engages in the debate over security and human rights is almost
immediately confronted by this dichotomy, tacit in the political call for a ‘new balance’ and explicit in newspaper editorials calling for the retreat from human
rights. Prompted by the urgency or supposed ‘exceptionalism’ of our times, politicians, judges and intellectuals are all addressing the central dilemma of this
dichotomy: how are we to protect freedom (through security) without denying its
essence (by violating human rights)? For liberals, the search for a new language of
reconciliation between security and human rights has arguably become one of
their most urgent intellectual challenges. Indeed, there is a growing sense in the
academy internationally that the stakes of the thoughts and arguments on this
question have been raised.1
The challenge of how best to safeguard freedom and democracy without squandering them is not simply a product of the threats arising out of 9/11 (or perceptions of them). It is a challenge that has always existed at the centre of the liberal
democratic enterprise. It is this pursuit that animates democratic politics, and the
tension that spurs its philosophical refinement. Moreover, if we are to remain
squarely within the liberal democratic tradition, many would argue that security

1
This is no less the case for the contributors to this volume, who came together at the Oxford
Colloquium on Security and Human Rights on 16 and 17 March 2006. Drawn from a variety of disciplinary perspectives—legal theory, criminology, criminal law, constitutional law, international law and
international relations, as well as government and legal practice—these contributors were able to bring
a range of views to bear on the question of how best to resolve the tension between security and the
protection of human rights.
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2 Liora Lazarus and Benjamin J Goold
and human rights must be reconciled.2 National and individual security strikes at
the heart of sovereignty: the capacity to maintain security, and demonstrably so, is
a litmus test of the functionality of the modern state.
From both Lockean and Kantian perspectives, what distinguishes a liberal
democracy from a totalitarian state is that the attainment of security through the
exercise of democratic sovereignty is justified ultimately by the pursuit of liberty
(which itself cannot be exercised in conditions of grave insecurity).3 Human
rights, as positive articulations of the constituents of liberty, are the benchmark by
which liberal democracies are judged. Constitutions, parliaments and courts act to
protect them and to constrain the executive’s overweening assertions of authority.
Security as the precondition for liberty, and human rights as the constituents of
liberty, are thus both inherent parts of the broader liberal democratic project:
[W]e must find ways of reconciling security with liberty, since the success of one
helps the other. The choice between security and liberty is a false choice . . . Our
history has shown us that insecurity threatens liberty. Yet if our liberties are
curtailed, we lose the values that we are struggling to defend.4

Given the evident relationship between the maintenance of security and the
preservation of rights within the liberal tradition, we might well ask why a language of reconciliation has become so politically elusive. If it is not the case that
the pursuit of security and respect for human rights are necessarily irreconcilable,
is the tension between the two a product of our collective inability to agree on a set
of assumptions, terms and rules for discussion? Or have the rules of the game, or
at least the rules of the debate, really changed?
I. SECURITY, RIGHTS AND THE ‘NEW NORMALCY’
A time of terror may not be the ideal moment to trifle with the most time-tested postulates of government under law. It is certainly not a good time to dispense lightly
with bedrock principles of our constitutional system.5

Despite the wisdom of Katyal and Tribe’s warning, the claim that 9/11 ushered in
an era of ongoing emergency that demands fundamental political, legal and constitutional reordering has acquired a seemingly irresistible currency. We are, it is
said, in a continuing ‘state of exception’,6 the end of which, due to the nature of
2 Tesón, FR, ‘Liberal Security’ in R Ashby Wilson (ed), Human Rights in the ‘War on Terror’
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005) 57; Luban, D, ‘Eight Fallacies about Liberty and
Security’ in R Ashby Wilson (ed), Human Rights in the ‘War on Terror’ (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 2005) 242, 245.
3 Tesón (2005) 60.
4 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (9/11 Commission), Report
(2004), available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/?report/?index.htm, 395.
5 Katyal, NK and Tribe, LH, ‘Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals’ (2002)
Yale Law Journal 1111, 1259.
6 For an argument that the ‘state of exception’ is a standing constituent of liberal regimes and thus
always a part of the ‘normal’, see Agamben, G, The State of Exception (Chicago, University of Chicago
Press, 2005).
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Introduction: Security and Human Rights 3
the super-terrorist threat,7 we cannot identify. In short, what was previously
viewed as the exception, a time of unprecedented crisis calling for appropriately
exceptional measures, has now become the norm. The claim is not the preserve of
only neo-conservative US politicians, such as Vice President Dick Cheney, who
argue that ‘emergency is the “new normalcy” ’.8 Supposedly left-wing European
leaders also argue that the ‘rules of the game have changed’.9 Similarly, the idea
that we are facing the ‘normalization of emergency conditions’10 and that the ‘age
of terror’ calls for unprecedented measures is now taken increasingly seriously
within the academy across an ever-extending range of the political spectrum.11
Even those more sceptical of these exceptionalist claims recognise that ‘there
seems to be a general acceptance in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001 that some adjustment in our scheme of civil liberties is inevitable’.12
Such is the currency of these propositions that previously marginal arguments
have become plausible, while positions that formerly attracted a broad political
consensus have come to be seen as naïve or passé. In this environment, Michael
Ignatieff’s promotion of ‘lesser evils’,13 Alan Dershowitz’s support for the legal
regulation of torture,14 Oren Gross’s endorsement of transparent illegality15 and
Bruce Ackerman’s endorsement of ‘suspicionless’ preventative detention under an
‘emergency constitution’16 have become the central arguments with which we
must engage.
Whereas 10 years ago such arguments might have settled at the fringes of
scholastic debate, the shoe is now very much on the other foot: constitutional and
international human rights once claimed a privileged moral status, their limitation
always requiring justification; but claims to security now appear to receive less
7
‘Super-terrorism’ is characterised as terrorism that has global aims, an ‘apocalyptic’ ideology,
‘war-like’ means and with which political negotiation is impossible: Freeman, M, ‘Order, Rights and
Threats: Terrorism and Global Justice’ in R Ashby Wilson (ed), Human Rights in the ‘War on Terror’
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005) 37, 38.
8
Remarks to the Republican Governors Association, Washington, DC, on 25 October 2001, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/?vicepresident/?news-speeches/?speeches/?text/?vp20011025.html.
Repeated in an interview to the television programme 60 Minutes II on 14 November 2001, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/?vicepresident/?news-speeches/?speeches/?vp20011114.html.
9
See UK Prime Minister’s Press Conference, 5 August 2005, available at http://www.number10.gov.uk/?output/?Page8041.asp.
10
Ackerman, B, ‘The Emergency Constitution’ (2004) 113 Yale Law Journal 1029, 1043.
11
The responses to this perceived condition are, however, quite varied. See, inter alia: Ackerman
(2004); Gross, O, ‘Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always be Constitutional?’
(2003) 112 Yale Law Journal 1011; Ignatieff, M, The Lesser Evil: Politics in an Age of Terror (Princeton,
Princeton University Press, 2004); Cole, D, ‘The Priority of Morality: The Emergency Constitution’s
Blind Spot’ (2004) 113 Yale Law Journal 173; Tribe, LH and Gudridge, PO, ‘The Anti-emergency
Constitution’ (2004) 113 Yale Law Journal 1801.
12
Waldron, J, ‘Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance’ (2003) 11(2) The Journal of Political
Philosophy 191.
13
Ignatieff (2004).
14
Dershowitz, A, ‘Tortured Reasoning’ in S Levinson (ed), Torture: A Collection (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2004) 14.
15
Gross (2003).
16
Ackerman (2004), but see now amended proposals in Ackerman, B, Before the Next Attack:
Preserving Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism (Hartford, Yale University Press, 2006).
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scrutiny than the assertion of rights that may restrict measures in its pursuit.
Whatever the empirical merits of the argument that we have entered an ‘age of
exception’—and it is far from clear how one would ever prove this—one thing is
becoming apparent: the claim is shifting the foundations of political and constitutional debate. It has become the tacit challenge against which we must formulate
our propositions.
As a consequence of the status of the perpetual emergency claim and statements
about the uniqueness of our present conditions, those who claim that we already
have the structures and institutions in place to deal with the threat at hand17 risk
being accused of a blind adherence to absolutism, perfection or idealism.18
According to Ignatieff, for example,
the belief that our existing rights and guarantees should never be suspended is a piece
of moral perfectionism . . . To claim that there are no lesser evil choices to be made
is to take refuge in the illusion that the threat of terrorism is exaggerated.19

Whereas in the past those concerned with questions of security within liberal
democracies may have stopped short of calling for the suspension of rights altogether, in the current climate the idea that certain human rights can be ‘turned off ’
when necessary has come to be regarded by many as a thoroughly reasonable reaction to the dangers allegedly faced by democratic societies. In effect, the exceptionalism argument has become pivotal, so much so that liberals and human rights
organisations must either rebut claims that our conditions are unique, or respond
to these supposedly exceptional conditions by adjusting our institutions, practices,
procedures and laws:
The season for talk of leaving the Constitution behind, while we grit our teeth and
do what must be done in times of grave peril—the season for talk of saving the
Constitution from the distortions wrought by sheer necessity, while we save ourselves from the dangers of genuine fidelity to the Constitution—is upon us.20

For many, then, the search for reconciliation between security and human rights
is really a search for a language that can claim a purchase on the political, legal and
popular imaginations within the existing climate of exceptionalism: a language
that engages with the assertion of exceptionalism and the claims of unique crisis,
while blunting its worst implications.
Of course, the currency of the exceptionalism claim has deeper social and political roots than the iconic collapse of the New York World Trade Center towers.
Two factors in particular underpin the social receptivity of the claim to exceptionalism. The first of these relates to what David Garland and others within the
realm of criminal justice have referred to as the emergence of a ‘culture of
17 See for example, Luban (2005); and Goldstone, R, ‘The Tension between Combating Terrorism
and Protecting Civil Liberties’ in R Ashby Wilson (ed), Human Rights in the ‘War on Terror’
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005) 242, 249.
18 See Gross on those who conduct ‘business as usual’: Gross (2003).
19 Ignatieff (2004) vii.
20 Tribe and Gudridge (2004).
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Introduction: Security and Human Rights 5
control’.21 According to these writers, late modern states are increasingly characterised by aspirations towards ‘public protection’, the ‘containment of danger’ and
the ‘management of risk’, all of which arise out of a perceived and politically
exploited condition of social ‘insecurity’.22
During the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, as governments began to shift
attention away from the elimination of crime—a problem that they had come to
regard as insoluble—to strategies aimed at its management and containment, a
new discourse emerged about the role of the state. Instead of presenting themselves as primarily responsible for addressing the problem of crime, states instead
began focusing on making people feel safer and more secure while also arguing
that responsibility for such security had to be shared with institutions and organisations outside of the state realm. Within political discourse, fear of crime and
questions of insecurity were elevated in status, so that the pursuit of ‘security’—a
term often invoked but rarely defined by politicians—became an overriding social
aim.
Insofar as this shift coincided with a gradual surrendering by states of primary
responsibility for other important public matters (such as health, transport and
education), it contributed to the emergence of a new, neo-liberal conception
of government. No longer is the state the unquestioned provider or guarantor of
public services or certain accepted social rights, but rather it is one player amongst
many. Whether this change was the product of the state’s awareness of its own
impotence—its inability to ‘solve’ the problem of crime and other social ills—or
an inevitable product of wider changes in governance brought on by the forces of
late modernity is open to discussion. Regardless of the reasons behind the shift, the
move to disperse responsibility for society’s problems usefully freed politicians
from having to answer for many of the failures of modern government. At the
same time, however, the admission that the state could no longer be the primary
provider of security, despite the political elevation of this aim, also threatened to
undermine state legitimacy.
It is in this complex and contradictory neo-liberal political environment that
Western political responses to the attacks of 9/11 need to be read. In countries like
the United States and the United Kingdom, the threat of super-terrorism starkly
exposed the limits of the state’s capacity to provide security for its citizens. But
equally, this threat presented governments with a novel opportunity to develop
new and powerful rhetorical arguments, in particular the claim to exceptionalism,
in favour of increased state power. Seen in this light, the popularity of exceptionalism is a product of a social transformation whereby the legitimacy of latemodern states has become increasingly bound up with their role as the guarantor
21
Garland, D, The Culture of Control (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001). See also: Simon, J,
‘ “Entitlement to Cruelty”: Neo-liberalism and the Punitive Mentality in the United States’ in
K Stenson and R Sullivan (eds), Crime, Risk, and Justice: The Politics of Crime Control in Liberal
Democracies (Portland, Willan Publishing, 2001) 125–43; and O’Malley, P, ‘Volatile and Contradictory
Punishment’ (1999) 3(2) Theoretical Criminology 175–96.
22
Garland (2001).
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of security and with a politics of security that seeks both to allay and exploit communal feelings of insecurity and fear.
The second factor underpinning the apparent effectiveness of the exceptionalism argument relates to what we term the ‘politics of rights scepticism’. Alongside
the rise of human rights discourse since 1945 and its seeming international
ubiquity after the end of the Cold War,23 there has been a strong philosophical
scepticism of the moral foundation of human rights claims and considerable political controversy regarding their judicial and constitutional protection.24 Although
human rights have been the benchmark of the liberal democratic ideal, there are
deep controversies as to how they should be realised, under what institutional conditions they should be pursued, and which specific rights may be branded as sufficiently fundamental to trump majoritarian desires.
Rights-sceptic arguments are the product variously of republican criticisms of
the constitutional and political legitimacy of judicial review;25 pragmatic empiricist, post-modern and conservative rejections of the idealist pretensions of
enlightenment rationalism;26 socialist and communitarian objections to the
egoistic individualism and atomistic legalism to which rights give rise; left-wing
suspicion, particularly in the United Kingdom, of the elite judiciary;27 and critical
pragmatic arguments regarding the emancipatory potential of human rights discourse.28 This complex amalgam of political, philosophical and pragmatic objections to human rights has generated a debate internal to rights discourse that has
made it particularly vulnerable to the competing and increasingly powerful discourse of security.
In essence, then, two divides need to be bridged if we are to find some way of
reconciling the pursuit of security with a respect for fundamental human rights.
23

Freeman, M, Human Rights: An Interdisciplinary Approach (Cambridge, Polity, 2002) ch 3.
Douzinas, C, The End of Human Rights (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2000) 1; Campbell, T, Ewing,
KD and Tomkins, A, Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001). See
also Lazarus, L, Contrasting Prisoners’ Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004) 163–8.
25 Kramer, LD, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 2004); Waldron, J, Law and Disagreement (Oxford, Oxford University Press,
1999); Bellamy, R, ‘Constitutive Citizenship versus Constitutional Rights: Republican Reflections on
the EU Charter and the Human Rights Act’ in T Campbell, KD Ewing and A Tomkins (eds), Sceptical
Essays on Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001); Tomkins, A, Our Republican
Constitution (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2005).
26 Minogue, K, ‘What is Wrong with Rights’ in C Harlow (ed), Public Law and Politics (London,
Sweet & Maxwell, 1986) 209, 209–12; Gray, J, Enlightenment’s Wake: Politics and Culture at the Close of
the Modern Age (London, Routledge, 1995) 172–3; Ryan, A, ‘The British, the Americans, and Rights’ in
M Lacey and K Haakonssen (eds), A Culture of Rights (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991)
375–95; Loughlin, M, ‘Rights, Democracy, and Law’ in T Campbell, KD Ewing and A Tomkins (eds),
Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001); Gearty, C, Can Human
Rights Survive (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006) ch 2; Klug, F, Values for a Godless Age
(London, Penguin, 2000) 154; Douzinas (2000).
27 Griffiths, J, The Politics of the Judiciary, 4th edn (London, Fontana, 1991); Griffiths, J, ‘The
Political Constitution’ (1979) 42 MLR 1; Ewing, K and Gearty, C, Freedom under Thatcher: Civil
Liberties in Modern Britain (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990) ch 8; Ewing, K and Gearty, C, The Struggle
for Civil Liberties (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000) ch 8.
28 Kennedy, D, ‘The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?’ (2001) 3
European Human Rights Law Review 245.
24
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On the one hand, we must critically engage with the politics of security in late
modern states—a politics in which appeals to security are increasingly used by
governments and politicians as a rhetorical device for the expansion of state
power. This necessitates the development of an understanding and critique of the
conditions in which security discourse—and its displacement of liberal values
and human rights—occurs. As a number of authors observe in this volume,
although much of the current debate over security can be traced to the events of
9/11, many of the arguments and policies that have emerged over the past five
years have their origins in longstanding political and social trends. Looked at in
this way, the preoccupation with security is best understood as a cipher for a range
of diverse concerns, and as such it is crucial that we retain a meta- or sociological
perspective on the apparent conflict between rights and security. We must in other
words engage with the social phenomenon of security, the social conditions in
which security discourse exists and the philosophical foundations of security
claims.
Equally, however, we must also address deeper philosophical concerns that
strike at the very heart of the human rights project. For it is not so much that security and rights have to be reconciled per se, but rather that the present concern
with collective security and the persistent claim to exceptionalism have exposed
and heightened a number of fundamental tensions that are inherent to modern
liberal democracies. In broaching the question of how to reconcile security and
human rights, we are in effect also asking how to balance between the individual
and the collective, between the political and the legal, and between political sovereignty and the rule of law. Thus, the pursuit of the mutual attainment of security
and human rights since 9/11 has provoked a re-engagement with questions that
are central to democratic orders and has peeled back any veneer of political consensus that may have surrounded them. The current fight is then not only about
security and rights, it is also about the essential institutional, procedural and substantive principles that we think a legitimate democracy ought to have. Clearly,
conservatives, civic republicans, communitarians and classical liberals will all have
different answers to what constitutes legitimacy in this context.
In developing a defence of human rights, if we are unable to be clear about why
the rule of law matters and why rights are worthy of respect—regardless of the
threats of terrorism—then it is unlikely that liberals will be able to resist arguments
aimed at curtailing legal safeguards in the name of security or assuaging the fears
of the majority. In this pursuit, it is not safe merely to fall back on previously
accepted political presumptions. Given the broader context in which this debate is
occurring, defenders of rights are correct to be wary of baldly asserting concepts
that, in these times, have become question-begging. We have to find new ways of
articulating established beliefs and must engage in new theoretical discussion with
a sharpened agenda. As Conor Gearty argues,
without a reworking of what the term ‘human rights’ means today, designed to give
it contemporary intellectual confidence, some theoretical zest, then the time might
come when firing the human rights argument will be greeted neither with warmth
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nor dismay but rather with blank indifference, or (which is worse) mute incomprehension: whatever can that term mean?29

In other words, if we are properly to defend human rights, we need fully to engage
with them.
In attempting to re-enter and realign the debate in this way it is important also
to recognise that there are disciplinary as well as political and philosophical divides
that must be overcome. Within the academy, different disciplines have developed
their own responses to the challenges of security in the years since 9/11, often with
little knowledge of or reference to the responses of related fields. While all of these
responses, from human rights scholars and practitioners, international lawyers,
international relations scholars and criminologists, are important and legitimate,
the absence of a shared language, or even a commonly held understanding of the
challenge, has perhaps undermined the effectiveness of the liberal response. Partly,
this is because of the variance in the questions or pursuits that different disciplines
hold as legitimate.
For legal scholars, the defence of the rule of law, legal institutions, the integrity
of legal rules and the specificity of rights reasoning feature foremost. For sociologists, criminologists and international relations scholars, on the other hand, questions of the effectiveness of human rights discourse and policy or underlying
changes in the social and political landscape may hold centre stage. Hence, this
book brings together those disciplines at the forefront of the conflict between
rights and security. By encouraging interdisciplinary communication, it is hoped
that we can not only learn from each other and gain greater insight into this conflict, but also ensure that we are able both to critique security whilst fully engaging
with human rights and to find a collective strategy that is expansive and coherent.
While certain disciplines may naturally favour an engagement with either rights or
security, it is important that the two approaches overlap. If we are to develop a language of reconciliation between security and human rights—or even simply think
about them effectively—then it is important to ensure that those involved in these
different debates are aware of each other and to work to enhance the analysis that
takes place at the margins and in the overlap between the two.

II. ENGAGING SECURITY

1. A Sociology of Security
When attempting to find a language of reconciliation between security and human
rights, or, put another way, when searching for some basis upon which liberals can
engage with those who promote the pursuit of security, it is important to return to
the question of what is actually at stake. Just as those in favour of increased security and restricting certain rights continue to critique the ‘human rights project’,
29

Gearty (2006) 20.
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so too must liberal scholars and rights advocates continue to scrutinise the claims
of the security lobby. Although many accounts of the tension between rights and
security rightly focus on definitions of torture, the serious dangers of preventative
detention and the requirements of a fair trial, the current concern with security
must also be seen in terms of longstanding and potentially disturbing structural
changes that are taking place in modern society. This volume contains a number
of contributions that seek to engage with the claims of the security lobby and to
place them within a broader sociological critique.
Ian Loader argues in his chapter that it is important to keep sight of what he
refers to as the ‘cultural lives’ of security and rights. He seeks to uncover the social
and political conditions that enable the rhetoric of security to override the rhetoric
of rights. In particular, Loader examines three examples from English criminal
justice politics that pre-date 9/11: miscarriages of justice, public responses to
closed-circuit television (CCTV) and the rise of ‘anti-social behaviour orders’
(ASBOs), which are designed to sidestep established procedural protections. By
identifying and examining some of the key rhetorical strategies that have been
employed by politicians and others, Loader reveals how they are able to ‘mobilise
a populist appeal to the idea of security, while presenting rights claims as the concern of remote special interest groups willing to play fast and loose with the safety
of their co-citizens’.30 Part of the story rests, Loader suspects, in the general distaste for rights within certain cultures (notably English culture), as well as a political concern that rights undermine collective values by insisting on a division
between individuals on the one hand and their communities on the other hand.
Aside from the fact that one of Loader’s stated aims is to encourage deeper investigation into the question of how best to advance human rights in this environment, he also contributes to the larger discussion on reconciliation by arguing that
such rights must be situated within a ‘solidaristic and egalitarian practice of
security’. Security, in the sense that Loader views it, is a central value of the good
society—and therefore also rights-regarding.
Like Loader, Benjamin Goold highlights the larger social and political implications of the current drive towards more security. He argues that it is important for
us to resist many of these demands—in particular the claim that more and better
state surveillance is needed—if we are to preserve our existing concepts of privacy
or at least retain some measure of control over the way in which we construct and
develop our identities. For Goold, 9/11 is significant because it provides the ongoing expansion of state surveillance in countries like the United States and the
United Kingdom with a new, seemingly irrefutable justification, namely the pursuit of security. As a consequence, traditional notions of identity based on narrative understandings of personal development are now under serious threat from
an emergent administrative form, the ‘categorical identity’. Although this shift
may be less obviously alarming than calls for use of torture or the suspension of
the right to a fair trial, it is nonetheless deeply problematic. In particular, Goold’s
30

I Loader in this volume, p 27.
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analysis suggests that the widespread expansion in surveillance that is currently
being driven by the rhetoric of security has amplified various underlying, ongoing
sociological changes that have made the public increasingly willing to surrender
their privacy and submit to demands for greater state power.
In essence, what unites Loader and Goold is an appeal for perspective on the
current preoccupation with security and a call for a more textured external critique that recognises that the apparent conflict between security and rights has its
origins in deep social and political changes that pre-date 9/11. Whereas Loader
points to the broader social and political contexts that shape the cultural lives of
security and rights, Goold also asks us to look beyond the immediate dangers of
security to larger developments in the role of surveillance in modern democratic
states. To a lesser extent, both authors also share a willingness to engage with the
practical claims of security, suggesting that the way forward to reconciliation may
involve a mixture of approaches, some legal and political, others rhetorical. While
not going so far as to endorse a pragmatic response to the politics of security, the
chapters by Loader and Goold argue that if liberals are to play an effective part in
the public debate over the future of human rights, we must engage with the
broader context in which security is being pursued and develop a robust ‘sociology of security’.

2. Exploiting the Language of Risk
If liberals are to resist the worst excesses of security, or at least to be able to respond
to its demands, then it is also unavoidable that they will have to engage with the
language of risk. One way in which this can be done is, as Bernard Harcourt does
in this volume with respect to racial profiling, to test the effectiveness of new
counter-terrorism and security measures on their own terms. Harcourt thus turns
the rhetoric of security back upon itself, demanding proof that rights-restricting
policies or programmes will in fact provide more security. In contrast to liberals
who have refused in the past to countenance profiling because of the strong belief
that such techniques are by definition discriminatory and therefore simply wrong,
Harcourt instead demands that advocates of such methods prove that they in fact
work to reduce the threat of terrorism. As he notes, since 9/11 the racial profiling
of Muslim men has been advocated by a range of commentators and law enforcement agencies, despite the fact that there ‘is no empirical evidence whatsoever, nor
a solid theoretical reason why racial profiling would be an effective measure—
rather than a counterproductive step resulting in detrimental substitutions and
increased terrorist attacks’.31 More disturbingly, Harcourt argues that, far from
deterring terrorists, profiling may in fact undermine the legitimacy of other antiterrorism measures and, crucially, ‘encourage the recruitment of terrorists from
outside the core profile and the substitution of other terrorist acts’.32
31
32

B Harcourt in this volume, p 75 (3 in original file).
Ibid, p 95 (29).
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Is Harcourt’s strategy one that defenders of human rights need to adopt if they
are to counter the claims of those obsessed with security? In other words, should
they be prepared to ‘get their hands dirty’ and participate in debates about the
effectiveness of measures that may have serious implications for human rights?
Certainly, Harcourt’s approach represents a significant departure from that of
many in Britain and Europe. Whereas US academics and human rights advocates
have been ready to take a pragmatic approach to the preservation of rights, on the
other side of the Atlantic there has been a distinct reticence to use such tools as
economic modelling and statistical analysis. For those concerned to maintain the
high ground, Harcourt’s approach may be a step too far. There is always the danger that by accepting that effectiveness matters, we might be forced to concede that
some new security measure that undermines rights, even torture, actually works
and cannot therefore be resisted. Crucially, however, liberals need to think carefully about how best to balance the need to engage in certain debates while
preserving some commitment to the idea of rights as trumps. If we do find that
profiling ‘works’ and that it significantly reduces the risks of future attacks, do we
risk being seen as hypocritical if we then fall back on more conventional, principled objections to such measures?
Like Harcourt, Lucia Zedner in this volume also engages with the language of
risk, not for the purposes of using it as a critical tool but with a view to exposing
some of the assumptions that drive the pursuit of security. According to Zedner,
it is fundamentally important to remember that discussions of security and the
limits of prevention are intimately bound up with perceptions of risk—perceptions that have been radically altered by the events of 9/11 and 7/7. Indeed, she
argues that while we continue to focus our attention on the more obvious manifestations of the current obsession with security and anti-terrorism, there is a danger that too little attention is being paid to ‘the degree to which the growing
sophistication of actuarial tools and huge advances in computational power both
enable and legitimate pre-emptive intervention’.33 For Zedner, because it is
impossible to separate these statistical tools from the political and policy choices
that animate our conceptions of risk, it follows that pre-emptive measures
designed to increase security can never be truly objective or divorced from our
political concerns and values. By highlighting this connection and drawing
together existing discourses on rights, risk and security, Zedner reveals one of the
inherent dangers of the current focus on security: by using risk categories to
impose restrictions on only targeted sections of the population, we minimise the
likelihood that such responses will be accompanied by healthy political debate or
‘invoke the natural political resistance generated by burdens that affect us all’.34
Taken together, the chapters by Harcourt and Zedner remind us that the emerging discourse of risk has not only provided a drive for much of the current obsession with security, but also fundamentally altered the way in which policy makers
33
34
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and governments assess the success or failure of new security measures. In our
efforts to respond to curtailments or modifications of existing human rights, it is
important to ensure that risk does not become the only lens through which concerns about security are viewed, or the only set of criteria that informs decision
making about them. This is a point that is also made by Didier Bigo and Elspeth
Guild, although for them the central challenge is to ensure that when risk is at the
centre of any public debate about security, the language used to describe that
risk—which inevitably structures the response to it—is accessible to all. Noting
that it is difficult to imagine an average person being able to ‘successfully navigate
the overwhelming professional discourses surrounding the management of threats
and not be under their “charm”’,35 Bigo and Guild construct a powerful argument
in favour of a common conception of risk, based in particular on the accepted
norm of the reasonable person or ‘man on the Clapham omnibus’. Fearing that
undue reliance on a specialist conception of risk gives too much power and influence to the security industry, they argue that reference to a ‘reasonable person’ can
act as an important ‘reality check’ against exceptional legal decision making. The
general discussion of risk and security must, they argue, be moved away from a fixation on worst-case scenarios—typically favoured by governments and the security industry—to a discourse based on reasonable grounds for a reasonable
person. By shifting the language of risk in this way, they argue, we are better able
to protect the rule of law and to ensure that many, rather than a few, voices are
heard in the security and human rights debate.

III. ENGAGING RIGHTS

A robust defence of rights needs to be situated within a critical appreciation of the
limit of rights, an engagement with the constitutional controversies they present
and an understanding of the particular political dilemmas to which they give rise
when society is faced with grave threats. It is not enough to assert rights as a good
in themselves by reference to metaphysical arguments that transcend social reality. Rights advocates must show how rights can work in practice, how the rule of
law can be maintained, why the integrity of the law matters and how rights-regarding institutions can be shown to work even when facing our most perilous social
challenges. Rights arguments need also to engage with the possibility of alternative
conceptions of rights, law and legal institutions, as well as rights-sceptical challenges, if they are to have a contemporary currency. There is, however, a difference
between critically engaging with such challenges and succumbing to their worst
excesses, as Judt warns:
The alacrity with which many of America’s most prominent liberals have censored
themselves in the name of the War on Terror, the enthusiasm with which they have
invented ideological and moral cover for war and war crimes and proffered that
35
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cover to their political enemies: all this is a bad sign. Liberal intellectuals used to be
distinguished precisely by their efforts to think for themselves, rather than in the service of others. Intellectuals should not be smugly theorising endless war, much less
confidently promoting and excusing it. They should be engaged in disturbing the
peace—their own above all.36

Thus, intellectuals now have to walk a tightrope between being single-mindedly
committed to rights to the point of dismissing issues of security, and providing the
intellectual legitimation for proponents of the security lobby.

1. Politics, the Rule of Law and a Culture of Justification
Two central dichotomies—between politics and legality, and between pragmatism
and idealism—exist within constitutional debate in ‘times of crisis’.37 This volume
contains a number of contributions that seek to establish a middle ground
between the polarities of pragmatic political responses to security threats and the
idealistic preservation of legality. In doing this, these contributors help to resolve
the background political and constitutional conflicts underpinning the tension
between security and human rights, thereby identifying the conditions in which a
language of reconciliation between these supposedly competing objectives might
be achieved.
In his chapter, David Dyzenhaus asserts that the middle ground between legality and political sovereignty rests in the development of principles of judicial due
deference grounded in a ‘culture of justification’. Because common law principles
of judicial review ‘rest on the distinction between inappropriate merits or correctness review and appropriate review of legality’38 they contain the possibility to
check the legality of administrative action while also affording leeway and respect
to administrative expertise. Hence, judicial deference to expert administrative tribunals that are set up to deal with sensitive security concerns, such as the Special
Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) in the United Kingdom, is not a necessary violation of rule of law values. The test, however, lies in just how that judicial
deference is exercised.
For Dyzenhaus, the overriding principle of the constitutional legitimacy of judicial review of security measures cannot be found exclusively in either liberal constitutionalism or democratic positivism but rather is situated in a distinct ‘culture
of justification’. This culture can be said to exist ‘when a political order accepts
that all official acts, all exercises of state power, are legal only on condition that
they are justified by law, where law is understood in an expansive sense, that is, as
including fundamental commitments such as those entailed by the principle of
36
Judt, T, ‘Bush’s Useful Idiots’ (2006) 28(18) London Review of Books, available at http://www.
lrb.co.uk/v28/n18/judt01_.html.
37
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legality and respect for human rights’.39 This onus of justification falls therefore on
the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. In such a culture, judicial due deference to executive and legislative decisions is not only possible but necessary for
the establishment of ‘an effective principle of legality’. The ‘very possibility of
deferring is what makes evaluation of the quality of reasoning necessary, but that
evaluation is of whether the decision-maker’s reasons were good enough in a
democratic society’.40 In this way, Dyzenhaus seeks to ‘reconcile the democratic
urge to place the development of law in the hands of the representatives of the
people with the liberal urge to ensure that such development does not interfere
with the rights of the individual more than can be justified’.41 To that extent, the
resolution between security and human rights, for Dyzenhaus, rests on the possibility of ‘deference as respect’ as opposed to ‘submissive deference’—and this type
of judicial due deference can only function properly within an established culture
of justification.
The culture of justification model need not apply only to municipal legal orders,
or describe the rule of law in a municipal setting. Nor, as Cathy Powell argues in this
volume, need it apply only to questions of judicial deference. As she demonstrates,
a culture of justification can legitimately be said to form part of the ‘institutional
design of the international legal order’. This is because ‘all law, including international law, entails the rule of law’ and as a consequence ‘requires that the law constrain those who wield power and hold them to account’.42 On this basis, Powell
critiques the increasing power of the United Nations Security Council in its antiterrorism activities; the acquiescence of many states to this power; and the capacity
of the Security Council to both make and enforce the laws for the international community, and to take and enforce its own executive decisions. She concludes provocatively that the international order is presently one based on a culture of authority,
rather than on a culture in which such assertions of power are justified.
Victor Ramraj is sceptical of the culture of justification approach, however. He
is concerned about Dyzenhaus and Hunt’s optimistic approach to what he terms
‘deferential standards of review’, which he believes leave considerable latitude to
the executive. He argues in his contribution that novel institutional design to deal
with security questions can considerably dilute independent judicial oversight and
that courts remain retrospective in their responses to emergency powers. These
risks, he argues, are not necessarily lessened in a culture of justification. Ramraj is
equally unconvinced, however, by pragmatic scepticism of the courts’ capacity to
stem exceptional powers effectively in the face of threats to national security. This
pragmatism, he argues, is exemplified in the extra-legal measures argument of
Oren Gross.43
39
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Gross’s argument is that the ‘highly deferential’ judicial attitude in states of
emergency results in a dilution of the rule of law and, worse, adds a ‘veneer of
legality’ to extra-legal measures. In these circumstances, Gross has argued, it is
better publicly to declare an action extra-legal when officials, in dealing with catastrophic cases, must ‘go outside the constitutional order and violate accepted constitutional principles, rules and norms’.44 The public must then decide whether
retrospectively to approve of the action or to hold actors accountable through
criminal prosecution. This, Gross has argued, establishes a bright line between
extra-legal measures, used in ‘truly exceptional situations’, and the integrity of the
rule of law. Against this view, Ramraj argues that the political strategy of promoting public admission of ‘extra-legal measures’ does not form an appropriate alternative because ‘in the long term, it is likely to prolong the underlying conflict,
compounding and perpetuating state abuses of power’.45 In particular, it is likely
that short-term actions taken in pursuit of security will alienate the very minorities that more fundamental political reforms should address.
In sum, while Ramraj accepts that both the ‘culture of justification’ and the
‘extra-legal measures’ approaches preserve the integrity of the rule of law while
taking a pragmatic approach to the limits of judicial review, they ‘nevertheless fail
to provide a comprehensive theory that combines the virtues of legality with the
pragmatism of a political response to emergencies’.46 Instead, Ramraj argues that
‘in a more complex conflict (or set of conflicts), such as the current “war on terror”, it may be necessary to resort to multiple strategies, legal and political.’47
Thus, he promotes an alternative, broad and multi-faceted political strategy that
addresses ‘the problem of minority alienation squarely both by entrenching rule
of law protections (for instance, human rights and equality guarantees) and by
reforming key institutions to build confidence’.48
Taken together, Dyzenhaus, Powell and Ramraj provide a broad and textured
approach to the constitutional dilemmas, in both domestic and international contexts, that arise in times of crisis. Their chapters suggest a theoretical foundation
for a language of reconciliation between security and human rights by providing a
middle ground between the pragmatic political approaches to exceptional
measures on the one hand and the strict adherence to the rule of law on the other
hand. The culture of justification approach emphasises the quality of reasoning as
the primary test for the legitimacy of legislative, executive and judicial action, and
rests in a clear recognition of the necessity of dialogue between the constitutional
actors who represent the political and the legal respectively. Although Ramraj is
more sceptical of the assertion that the exercise of judicial deference can also be
rights-regarding, his emphasis on political strategies that address the root causes
Business’ in VV Ramraj, M Hor and K Roach (eds), Global Anti-terrorism Law and Policy (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2005) 92.
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of terrorist threats is entirely complementary to the culture of justification
approach.

2. The Limits and Dangers of Balancing
One now common approach to the task of reconciling security and human rights
is to invoke metaphors of balance. Typically drawing on appeals to common sense
and everyday reasoning, policy makers and governments have in recent years
argued for a ‘rebalancing’ of the criminal justice system in favour of better security
and more public protection, and fewer substantive and procedural rights-based
restrictions on law enforcement. Prime Minister Tony Blair in a speech delivered
in June 2006 declared that it is both right and necessary for governments to rebalance the criminal justice system ‘in favour of the decent, law-abiding majority who
play by the rules and think others should too’, and to decide whose civil liberties
should ‘take priority’ in a given situation.49 Although the metaphor of balance is a
tempting starting point for a language of reconciliation between security and
human rights, it is not one that any of the authors in this book embrace. As both
Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner point out in this volume—in keeping with
works by Dworkin and Waldron50—the argument for balancing not only lacks
specificity and militates against any structured consideration of the value of rights,
it naturally lends itself to the political rhetoric of greater security and to the curtailment of rights.
According to Ashworth, there is a danger that political discussions of balancing
and proportionality can obscure genuine conflicts between the promotion of
human rights and the pursuit of security. Rhetorical appeals for a rebalancing of
the criminal justice system in favour of greater security and public protection
assume not only that such an exercise is possible but that once balanced, the relationship between rights and security will be a stable one. For Ashworth, a more
productive approach is to establish first a clear hierarchy of rights and then
develop new modes of reasoning and discussion that acknowledge the fact that
certain rights are more subject to the claims of security than others. Although he
admits that the success of such an approach will largely depend on the extent to
which decision-making bodies such as the courts are prepared to enter into a genuine dialogue with rights advocates and proponents of security, Ashworth’s
approach engages directly with those who question the idea of rights as trumps, as
well as the notion that reconciling rights and security is simply a matter of reordering certain political priorities. Like Dyzenhaus, he also recognises the importance
of establishing clear norms for the evaluation of evidence relating to perceived
threats.
49 Prime Minister Tony Blair, ‘Our Nation’s Future’, Speech delivered in Bristol on 23 June 2006,
available at http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page9737.asp.
50 Dworkin, R, ‘The Threat to Patriotism’, New York Review of Books, 28 February 2002; Waldron
(2003).
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This insistence on structured engagement with the substance of human rights
and the security claims posited in order to restrict them is important. As recent
experiences have shown, there is a danger that zealous governments may overstate
the risks of terrorism when attempting to garner public support for new security
measures, legal reform or military action. By ensuring that there are clear, or at
least identifiable, standards by which evidence for such actions can be judged by
the judiciary and (where appropriate) the public at large, we improve the chances
not only of there being a meaningful discussion between different sides of the
security debate, but also that members of the executive can be held accountable for
their actions. Equally, human rights cannot simply be held up as trumps without
a clear and rigorous exposition of the exact protections to which such rights give
rise and of the reasons such protections cannot be weakened in the face of security
claims. There is, in short, an onus on all sides of the security and rights debate to
make clear, structured and accessible arguments.

3. The Integrity of Law
Another question raised by a number of the authors in this volume is whether
established criminal law principles and practices are capable of meeting the
demands of security. Although these authors share similar concerns, their three
chapters take quite different approaches to answering this question.
As Kent Roach reminds us in his contribution, there is ample evidence to suggest that the perception of perpetual crisis continues to generate exceptional
national and international legal measures. Indeed, the detention of ‘illegal
combatants’ at Guantanamo Bay, the broad powers incorporated into the US
PATRIOT Act 2001, the indefinite detention powers of the UK Anti-terrorism,
Crime and Security Act 2001 and the freezing of assets of those suspected of terrorism are all examples of this. Observing that ‘trends in anti-terrorism laws,
unlike trends in fashion, do not fade away’,51 Roach is keen to stress that because
past measures and procedural reforms are rarely evaluated or repealed before new
ones are instituted, there is a danger that misguided trends and presumptions will
continue to exert influence on how we respond to terrorism. In addition, he notes
that because many new anti-terrorism measures cut across different areas of the
law—most notably criminal law and immigration law—there is a danger that the
assembled ‘bricolage’ may hide the extent of the damage that is being done to fundamental legal principles. As a result, Roach argues that even though many new
and proposed anti-terrorism measures—such as incitement offences based on the
principles set out in UN Security Council Resolution 1624—may end up having a
disproportionate and ultimately discriminatory effect on already suspect communities, they may also contribute to a more general erosion of the rule of law.

51

K Roach in this volume, p 229 (4 in original file).

(B) Goold&Lazarus Ch1

17/5/07

15:56

Page 18

18 Liora Lazarus and Benjamin J Goold
If Roach’s chapter serves as an implied caution against expanding the existing
law before we have had time to assess or even reflect on its implications, then
Zedner sounds an even clearer warning. For Zedner, many of the legislative measures enacted in the United Kingdom in the aftermath of 9/11 and the London
bombings represent an attempt on the part of the government to sidestep normal
legal channels and rule of law safeguards. According to Zedner, pre-emptive measures such as control orders are dangerous because they typically circumvent
established criminal law values, such as proportionality of sentence and the need
for blameworthiness, by ensuring that assessments of risk and dangerousness are
dealt with in the civil sphere. This not only leads to the imposition of restrictions
that are prospective and often expressive in character, but also enables governments to avoid the sort of rigorous public or legislative debate that usually accompanies proposed expansions in the substantive criminal law.
In contrast to both Roach and Zedner, Shlomit Wallerstein presents a case for
extending existing law in times of insecurity, arguing in her contribution that the
state is entitled to use the law and other coercive measures in order to provide
security for its citizens. Her claim, based on well-established principles of individual self-defence, is hardly novel, and politicians in a host of countries have become
increasingly fond of referring to the state’s right to defend itself. However,
Wallerstein rightly notes that to date the claim has not been clearly or rigorously
examined, in terms either of its foundation or of its possible implication for
broader legal principles. Observing that the state ‘is an artificial entity created for
the purpose of securing its citizens’, Wallerstein suggests that it is entirely appropriate for states—within limits and by reference to what is necessary and proportionate in the particular circumstances—to make use of substantive criminal law
in their efforts to defend those who live within their borders. Although she
acknowledges that extending the power of the state to criminalise activities has its
dangers and may ultimately lead to a curtailment of civil liberties, she argues at the
same time that it is nonetheless crucial to admit openly that the state is uniquely
placed and therefore duty-bound to respond to terrorism and threats to individual security.
As all three of these authors demonstrate, the demands of security have serious
implications for the integrity of the criminal law and for the extent to which adherence to established criminal law principles and procedures should restrain
responses to terrorism and other serious threats. Just as liberals must engage with
political and policy arguments that threaten to undermine established human
rights, so too must they expose substantive changes to the criminal law to careful
analysis and critique. Equally, however, they must insist that changes in the law are
based on rigorous arguments for legal change rather then loose or expedient
political or moral arguments. While all of this may mean that we have to enter
dangerous territory and seriously consider alternative conceptions of the criminal
law and established legal concepts and boundaries, failing to engage in this way
risks greater marginalisation and, more worryingly, removes the possibility of
influencing future reforms.
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IV. SECURITY AS A RIGHT: THE RESOLUTION?

The present fixation with the balance between security and human rights tends to
obscure the parallel development of the notion of security as a human right. As
Neil MacFarlane argues in this volume, ‘the evolution of the discourse on security
may considerably enhance the capacity for international protection of the human
rights of individuals and communities at risk from violence’.52 Clearly, the United
Nations Declaration of Human Rights and numerous other human rights conventions and constitutions around the world enunciate that ‘everyone has the
right to life, liberty and security of person’.53 While this right has traditionally been
understood in its negative sense as the security of the citizen from state action, it
is progressively being developed as a positive right to state action in pursuit of the
security of its citizens. In the international realm, the increasingly popular concept
of ‘human security’ is moving the conception of international security away from
its traditional association with sovereign military action between states, to one
focused on the well-being of citizens within states. This international movement is
also associated with a broadening acceptance that security is a precondition not
only of human and economic development54 but also of individuals’ capacity to
exercise their human rights to freedom and dignity.
The growing international emphasis on ‘human security’ is closely paralleled
with the development of the ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine. Recently endorsed
in the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome Document, this doctrine recognises the
responsibility of sovereign states to protect their own populations from genocide,
war crimes and ethnic cleansing, and urges the international community to take
collective action when states fail to fulfil this obligation.55 These international
developments are mirrored in jurisdictions across the world, including the United
Kingdom, Canada, South Africa and India, where courts are increasingly imposing positive obligations on the state as a correlative of the individual’s right to
security.
So what are we to make of these developments? Is this the way in which the supposedly competing imperatives of security and human rights may be reconciled?
Certainly, those seeking to achieve such a reconciliation may be tempted to use the
concepts of human security, the right to security or the responsibility to protect
both to temper the authoritarian overtones of the language of security, as well as
to provide a potentially new legitimating framework for human rights in the face
of widespread human rights scepticism. Four chapters in this volume explore this
approach. Sandra Fredman and Liora Lazarus look at the development of the right
52
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to security in a range of domestic jurisdictions, while Neil McFarlane and Jennifer
Welsh explore the international development of ‘human security’ and the ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine.
Drawing on the work of Nussbaum and Sen,56 Fredman proffers a compelling
theoretical case for a conception of the right to security—as freedom from fear and
want—that is embedded in a deeper understanding of human freedom. For
Fredman, the right to security ought to incorporate ‘the right to demand from the
state the minimum resources necessary to fulfil one’s capabilities’.57 From this
platform, Fredman critiques the judicial development of the right to security in
Canada, South Africa and the United Kingdom, exposing how these judicial
approaches reflect ‘background understandings of choice and responsibility’.58
She argues that courts should apply interpretive principles founded on the prevention of destitution and degradation and shaped by the pursuit of dignity, fairness and equality. For Fredman, the development of the right to security within
the courts can only be successful if courts ‘deepen their understanding of the ways
in which positive rights and obligations interact’. In other words, it is essential to
locate the right to security within ‘a community with reciprocal benefits and
responsibilities, rather than in the competitive arena of individualised rightsbearers’.59
The contribution by Lazarus is concerned with the tendency of domestic courts
and a number of human rights instruments to ground a broadening array of constitutional rights in a meta-right to security. While acknowledging that recourse to
a ‘right to security’ may presently be a useful tool for the achievement of a variety
of political ends, Lazarus argues that its widening legal conceptualisation has the
potential to ‘undermine accepted understandings of the foundations of fundamental rights reasoning’.60 She warns that if the right to security becomes the
meta-principle upon which all other rights rest, this can also inadvertently legitimise security measures that encroach upon other human rights. There is therefore a difference in Lazarus’ view between ‘securing rights’ and ‘securitising rights’.
Although tempted as a consequence to reject altogether the argument for a right
to security, Lazarus opts rather to engage with the evident development of the
right in a number of jurisdictions. Nevertheless, in contrast to Fredman’s broader
conception, she argues that courts must restrict the right to security to a narrow
and distinctive right to be protected from ‘critical and pervasive’ threats of harm
to person. It is, in her view, the role of courts to temper the rhetoric of ‘securitising rights’.
The varying approaches of Fredman and Lazarus are echoed in the ‘conceptual
disagreement over the purview of human security’ in the international realm.61 As
56
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MacFarlane notes, two ‘general clusters’ of thought have developed, one arguing
that poverty, famine and widespread disease represent a far graver threat to human
security than physical violence, the other arguing that broadening the term
‘human security’ undermines its potential as an analytical and policy tool. This
dispute has arisen, MacFarlane notes, because of the international competition for
scarce resources, which has resulted in the development community’s politically
expedient emphasis on the economic dimension of security. Nevertheless,
MacFarlane argues that both sides of the debate are unified in their attempt to
‘privilege human beings in security discourse’, a process he terms the ‘humanisation of security’. This has in turn led to ‘numerous normative and legal developments’ on the international stage, not least the development of the idea that states
internationally have the ‘responsibility to protect’ citizens both within their own
jurisdictions and, collectively, in other states where there are grave threats of harm
to individuals. These developments, argues MacFarlane, have fundamentally
shifted the grounding principle of state sovereignty in the law of states, as well as
the conception of the role of states in the defence of individual security. In
MacFarlane’s view, this reordering of the sovereignty principle is the most important consequence of the humanisation of security and has fundamental implications for the future development of international law and relations. Given the
United States’ growing recourse to the language of its ‘responsibility to protect’
citizens around the world, not to mention its use of this language to prompt the
UN Security Council into action, MacFarlane is led to suggest that this shift in
principles of sovereignty will not always be benign.
Jennifer Welsh is similarly wary. Her contribution traces the evolution of the
‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine up to its endorsement in the UN 2005 World
Summit Outcome Document and critically analyses its implications. Welsh
emphasises two important aspects of this development. First, she shows how the
term ‘responsibility to protect’ has come to displace the language of ‘humanitarian intervention’. Thus instead of expressing a ‘right of intervention’, states can
now claim a ‘responsibility to protect’ individuals in other states where grave violations of human rights are occurring. Second, Welsh shows how the doctrine has
been developed as a means to reconcile the traditional antipathy between human
rights and state sovereignty in international law. This reconciliation has occurred,
Welsh argues, by linking the ‘very notion of sovereignty . . . more closely to the
responsibility of states to their citizens’.62 However, Welsh does not view this
emphasis on responsibilities instead of rights that citizens can invoke as entirely
unproblematic. Because ambiguity remains as to who should fulfil the responsibility to protect when states fail, and at what stage the responsibility transfers from
the state in question to the international community at large, Welsh is sceptical as
to whether the language of the UN Outcome Document has actually enhanced the
capacity of international actors to challenge state sovereignty effectively.
Moreover, Welsh demonstrates that the expression of the responsibility to protect
62
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in the Outcome Document is weaker than that originally conceived by the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001,
and it in effect ‘circumscribes the international community’s obligation to protect
individuals from massive human rights violations’.63 Given these factors, argues
Welsh, there is a danger that the language of the ‘responsibility to protect’ sets up
false expectations, namely a belief on the part of people under persecution that
‘outsiders’ will honour their right to security by intervening when in fact the
nature of the international responsibility to do so still is not clear.
Welsh and the other commentators in this section reveal some disquiet about
the directions in which the right to security, human security and the ‘responsibility to protect’ are developing. These objections do not amount to a rejection of the
central concepts; however, nor do they all move in the same direction. For
Fredman, the right to security fails if it rests on an individualistic conception of
human rights that is disconnected from a broader material understanding of
human agency and the values of dignity and equality. For Lazarus, the risk of securitising rights leads her to argue for courts to develop a narrow conception of the
right to security as a right to be free from ‘critical and pervasive’ threats of harm.
While MacFarlane welcomes the humanisation of security, he is hesitant about the
ramifications of associated shifts in the conceptions of sovereignty under the law
of states. Finally, Welsh sounds a warning about the move from rights to responsibilities as a means of securing citizens and is concerned that the 2005 Outcome
Document’s expression of the ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine represents a
weakening of the international community’s existing obligation to protect individuals’ human rights.
CONCLUSION

Notwithstanding the intellectual and disciplinary diversity amongst the authors
who feature in this volume, they are united by the desire to move the current
debate over security and human rights forward. They are equally concerned to do
this in a way that does not underestimate the importance of security or undermine
the legitimacy of rights. Clearly, reconciling the interests of security with a respect
for fundamental rights is no easy task, and while finding a language of reconciliation—or acknowledging security as a right—may help to bring the two sides of the
debate closer together, it is unlikely to resolve all of the tensions that are identified
in this book. We must accept that the conflict between security and rights is a fundamental and recurring problem that will always be a central challenge for the liberal democratic project, even in times of peace or after threats of imminent
terrorist attack have receded. If we are to move forward, however, we must do
more than simply recognise this truth: we must embrace it and continue to seek
new ways of thinking about this conflict and of minimising the negative effects
that an absolutist commitment to either security or rights may produce.
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If liberal academics and intellectuals are to offer a way forward, they must as a
matter of urgency find a language that can claim a purchase on the broader political imagination within conditions of crisis. If academics are blessed with the freedom to offer a critical reflective response to the conditions of our world, they
might also reflect on their responsibility to develop critiques with which the wider
world can engage. In short, intellectuals who can offer clarity, detachment and
rigour on the relationship between rights and security—or even develop ways of
reconciling them—cannot risk being marginalised in a time of supposed exception.
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